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ABSTRACT
We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models
of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an ``oblivious equilibrium,''
in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the
long run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states.
We prove that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a
certain  ``light-tail''  condition,  then  oblivious  equilibria  closely  approximate  Markov  perfect
equilibria. We develop bounds that can be computed to assess the accuracy of the approximation for
any given applied problem. Through computational experiments, we find that the method often















Ericson and Pakes (1995) (hereafter EP) introduced an approach to modeling industry dynamics in which
entry, exit, and investment, together with idiosyncratic shocks, result in heterogeneity among ﬁrms. The
analysis of such models — which we will refer to as EP-type models — relies on computation of Markov
perfect equilibria (MPE) using dynamic programming algorithms (e.g., Pakes and McGuire (1994)). A great
advantage of the EP framework is that it is easily extended to cover many important dynamic phenomena.1
A major shortcoming, however, is the computational complexity of solving for MPE. Methods that acceler-
ate these computations have been proposed (Judd (1998), Pakes and McGuire (2001) and Doraszelski and
Judd (2003)). However, in practice computational concerns have typically limited the analysis to industries
with just a few ﬁrms. Such limitations have made it difﬁcult to construct realistic empirical models, and
application of the EP framework to empirical problems has been rare (exceptions include Gowrisankaran
and Town (1997), Benkard (2004), Jenkins, Liu, Matzkin, and McFadden (2004), and Ryan (2005)). More
generally, model details are often dictated as much by computational concerns as economic ones.
In an EP-type model, at each time, each ﬁrm has a state variable that captures its competitive advantage.
Though more general state spaces can be considered, we focus on the simple case where the ﬁrm state is an
integer. The value of this integer can represent, for example, a measure of product quality, the ﬁrm’s current
productivity level, or its capacity. Each ﬁrm’s state evolves over time based on investments and random
shocks. The industry state is a vector representing the number of ﬁrms with each possible value of the ﬁrm
state variable. Even if ﬁrms are restricted to symmetric strategies, the number of relevant industry states (and
thus, the compute time and memory required for computing a MPE) becomes enormous very quickly. For
example, most industries contain more than 20 ﬁrms, but it would require more than 20 million gigabytes
of computer memory to store the policy function for an industry with just 20 ﬁrms and 40 ﬁrm states. As a
result, it seems unlikely that exact computation of equilibria will ever be possible in many applied problems
of interest.
With this motivation, in this paper we instead propose an approximation method, one that dramatically
reducesthecomputationalcomplexityofEP-typemodelsinindustrieswithmanyﬁrms. Theintuitionbehind
our approach is as follows. Consider an EP-type model in which ﬁrm shocks are idiosyncratic. In each
period, some ﬁrms receive positive shocks and some receive negative shocks. Now suppose there are a large
number of ﬁrms. It is natural to think that changes in individual ﬁrms’ states average out at the industry
1See, for example, Berry and Pakes(1993), Gowrisankaran(1999), Fershtmanand Pakes (2000), de Roos (2002), Judd, Schmed-
ders, and Yeltekin (2002), Doraszelski and Markovich (2003), Langohr (2003), Song (2003), Markovich (2003), Benkard (2004),
Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2004), Jenkins, Liu, Matzkin, and McFadden (2004), and Besanko,
Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2005), as well as Pakes (2000) for a survey.
1level, such that the industry state does not change much over time. In that case, each ﬁrm could make near-
optimal decisions knowing only its own ﬁrm state and the long run average industry state. We call oblivious
strategies, strategies for which a ﬁrm considers only its own state and the long run average industry state, and
we will deﬁne a new solution concept, called oblivious equilibrium, in which ﬁrms use oblivious strategies.
Computing an oblivious equilibrium is simple because dynamic programming algorithms that optimize over
oblivious strategies require compute time and memory that scale only with the number of ﬁrm states, and
not with the number of ﬁrms. Indeed, it is easy to compute oblivious equilibria for industries with thousands
of ﬁrms and hundreds of ﬁrm states.
To formalize the intuition above, we prove an asymptotic result that provides sufﬁcient conditions for
oblivious equilibria to closely approximate MPE as the market size grows. It may seem that this would be
true provided that the average number of ﬁrms in the industry grows to inﬁnity as the market size grows.
However, this is not sufﬁcient. If the market is highly concentrated — for example, as is the case with
Microsoft in the software industry — then the approximation is unlikely to be accurate. A strategy that does
not keep track of the dominant ﬁrm’s state will not perform well. Instead, we show that, alongside some
technical requirements, a sufﬁcient condition for oblivious equilibria to well approximate MPE asymptoti-
cally is that they generate a ﬁrm size distribution that is “light-tailed,” in a sense that we will make precise.
For example, if the demand system is given by a logit model and the spot market equilibrium is Nash in
prices, then the condition holds if the average ﬁrm size is uniformly bounded for all market sizes.
We provide an algorithm based on dynamic programming that computes oblivious equilibria. The algo-
rithm is computationally light, often terminating within a couple minutes of run time on a common laptop
computer even for industries with thousands of ﬁrms. It is also easy to implement, requiring, typically,
fewer than two hundred lines of Matlab code. This represents a considerable savings over existing algo-
rithms. Another distinguishing feature of the algorithm is that it places no a priori restrictions on the number
of ﬁrms or the number of ﬁrm states. Instead, these are determined endogenously and computed alongside
the oblivious equilibrium.
Our asymptotic result provides a condition under which the approximation is accurate for large markets.
We also derive bounds on the approximation error that can be efﬁciently computed for any given applied
problem. Despite the practical importance of such error bounds, there are very few cases in the approximate
dynamicprogrammingliteraturewhereresearchershavebeenabletoprovideusefulboundingtechniquesfor
high-dimensional stochastic control problems. Possibly the only relevant examples involve optimal stopping
(Haugh, Kogan, and Wang 2004) and portfolio optimization (Haugh, Kogan, and Wang 2005). As such, our
bounding technique represents a signiﬁcant contribution. We show that these error bounds can be derived
2quite generally; they do not require many of our modeling assumptions. Furthermore, while it is important
that there be no aggregate shocks for the asymptotic results to hold, we are able to derive error bounds
even for models that incorporate aggregate shocks. Using this bounding algorithm, we ﬁnd that oblivious
equilibria often offer accurate approximations for industries involving hundreds of ﬁrms, and in some cases
even tens of ﬁrms.
These results suggest that, by using oblivious equilibria to approximate MPE, it is possible to greatly
increasethesetofproblemsthatcanbeanalyzedusingEP-typemodels. Still, thereremainsasetofproblems
where exact computation is beyond reach but the approximation is not likely to work well. Such problems
would likely involve industries with moderate to large numbers of ﬁrms that still remain highly concentrated.
Our hope is that, by including more information in the approximation, the concept of oblivious equilibrium
can also serve as a basis for approximations for these cases. For example, extending the approximation so
that ﬁrms track not just their own state, but also the states of several of the largest ﬁrms in the industry,
and/or the total number of ﬁrms in the industry, may yield better approximations.2 Deriving bounds on the
approximation error for such cases is not a trivial extension of the proofs in this paper, and thus will be a
topic of future research.
Though our emphasis is on the use of oblivious equilibrium as an approximation of MPE, oblivious
equilibrium can also be motivated as a behavioral model in its own right. If observing the industry state and
designing strategies that keep track of it are costly, and do not lead to signiﬁcant increases in proﬁt, ﬁrms
may be better off using oblivious strategies.
The concept of oblivious equilibrium is closely related to Hopenhayn (1992). Hopenhayn models an
industry that hosts an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms, each of which garners an inﬁnitesimal fraction of the market.
His model is tractable because it assumes that the industry state is constant over time, implicitly assuming a
law of large number holds. This assumption is based on the same intuition that motivates our consideration
of oblivious equilibrium. However, our goal is to analyze models that closely reﬂect real world industries
that have ﬁnite numbers of ﬁrms. Also, our EP-type model is more general because the transitional dynamics
resulting from ﬁrms’ investment strategies are generated by equilibrium behavior that is explicitly modeled.
Hopenhayn abstracts from this aspect of the model and instead assumes that ﬁrms’ state trajectories (their
productivities) follow exogenous Markov processes.3
Our approach also has similarities to a number of other past literatures. The light-tail condition we
considerisanalogoustonotionsofdiffuseindustrystructureinlargemarketsassociatedwithSutton(1991)’s
2Note also that related approaches have been used in the past, most notably to solve stochastic growth models (Krusell and
A. A. Smith (1998)).
3Note that Klette and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003) model investment explicitly in Hopenhayn-style models.
3exogenous sunk cost model. Though our goals are different, our asymptotic results are close in spirit to the
work of Novshek and Sonnenschein (1978) who, in a static setting, provide conditions under which Cournot-
Nash equilibrium converges to Walras competitive equilibrium when there is free entry. The notion that,
for asymptotically large markets, strategies can remain effective while ignoring information and strategic
behavior also appears in Vives (2002), in the context of Cournot models. Finally, Jovanovic and Rosenthal
(1988) consider sequential equilibria in a model where equilibrium strategies can often be represented as
simple functions of summary statistics of the distribution of ﬁrm states. This differs from our context, where
equilibrium strategies are in reality very complex, but can sometimes be well approximated using simple
functions.
There are a variety of relevant economic issues that can be studied using our methods. As an example,
we brieﬂy explore an important question in industrial organization: what features of an industry determine
whetheranindustrybecomesfragmentedorremainsconcentratedasthemarketgrowsinsize? Sutton(1991)
sought to identify simple features of an industry that distinguish models that lead to these two outcomes. In
our model, through computational experiments, we show that an arbitrarily small increase in a single model
parameter that identiﬁes the extent of vertical product differentiation, can turn an asymptotically fragmented
market into an asymptotically concentrated one. These results show that the predictions of Sutton (1991)
may sometimes be quite sensitive. For example, they imply that very different market structures might
be observed in the same industry across markets that are the same size and that have indistinguishable
characteristics. Note that our results remain broadly consistent with Sutton (1991) since the extent of vertical
product differentiation impacts the returns to investment. Consistent with Sutton (1991), industries with
higher returns to investment (even if the difference may be arbitrarily small) tend to be more concentrated.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the dynamic industry model. In Section 3 we
introduce the concept of oblivious strategies and oblivious equilibrium. In Section 4 we provide conditions
under which oblivious strategies approximate MPE strategies asymptotically as the market size grows. In
Section 5 we provide methods for computing oblivious equilibria and error bounds. In Section 6 we report
results from computational experiments. Finally, Section 7 presents conclusions and a discussion of future
research directions.
42 A Dynamic Model of Imperfect Competition
In this section we formulate a model of an industry in which ﬁrms compete in a single-good market. Our
model is close in spirit to that of Ericson and Pakes (1995), but with some differences. Most notably, we
modify the entry and exit processes in Ericson and Pakes (1995) so as to make them more realistic when
there are a large number of ﬁrms. Additionally, our asymptotic results do not hold with aggregate industry
shocks so our model includes only idiosyncratic shocks.
2.1 Model and Notation
The industry evolves over discrete time periods and an inﬁnite horizon. We index time periods with non-
negative integers t ∈ N (N = {0,1,2,...}). All random variables are deﬁned on a probability space
(Ω,F,P) equipped with a ﬁltration {Ft : t ≥ 0}. We adopt a convention of indexing by t variables that are
Ft-measurable.
Each ﬁrm that enters the industry is assigned a unique positive integer-valued index. The set of indices
of incumbent ﬁrms at time t is denoted by St. At each time t ∈ N, we denote the number of incumbent ﬁrms
as nt.
Firm heterogeneity is reﬂected through ﬁrm states. To ﬁx an interpretation, we will refer to a ﬁrm’s state
as its quality level. However, ﬁrm states might more generally reﬂect productivity, capacity, the size of its
consumer network, or any other aspect of the ﬁrm that affects its proﬁts. At time t, the quality level of ﬁrm
i ∈ St is denoted by xit ∈ N.
We deﬁne the industry state st to be a vector over quality levels that speciﬁes, for each quality level
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x=0 s(x) < ∞
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. This will allow us, for example,
to consider derivatives of functions with respect to the industry state. For each i ∈ St, we deﬁne s−i,t ∈ S
to be the state of the competitors of ﬁrm i; that is, s−i,t(x) = st(x) − 1 if xit = x, and s−i,t(x) = st(x),
otherwise. Similarly, n−i,t denotes to the number of competitors of ﬁrm i.
In each period, each incumbent ﬁrm earns proﬁts on a spot market. A ﬁrm’s single period expected
proﬁt π(xit,s−i,t) depends on its quality level xit and its competitors’ state s−i,t.
The model also allows for entry and exit. In each period, each incumbent ﬁrm i ∈ St observes a positive
real-valued sell-off value φit that is private information to the ﬁrm. If the sell-off value exceeds the value of
continuing in the industry then the ﬁrm may choose to exit, in which case it earns the sell-off value and then
5ceases operations permanently.
If the ﬁrm instead decides to remain in the industry, then it can invest to improve its quality level. If a
ﬁrm invests ιit ∈ <+, then the ﬁrm’s state at time t + 1 is given by,
xi,t+1 = xit + w(ιit,ζi,t+1),
where the function w captures the impact of investment on quality and ζi,t+1 reﬂects uncertainty in the
outcome of investment. Uncertainty may arise, for example, due to the risk associated with a research and
development endeavor or a marketing campaign. We denote the unit cost of investment by d.
In each period new ﬁrms can enter the industry by paying a setup cost κ. Entrants do not earn proﬁts in
the period that they enter. They appear in the following period at state xe ∈ N and can earn proﬁts thereafter.
Each ﬁrm aims to maximize expected net present value. The interest rate is assumed to be positive and
constant over time, resulting in a constant discount factor of β ∈ (0,1) per time period.
In each period, events occur in the following order:
1. Each incumbent ﬁrms observes its sell-off value and then makes exit and investment decisions.
2. The number of entering ﬁrms is determined and each entrant pays an entry cost of κ.
3. Incumbent ﬁrms compete in the spot market and receive proﬁts.
4. Exiting ﬁrms exit and receive their sell-off values.
5. Investment outcomes are determined, new entrants enter, and the industry takes on a new state st+1.
2.2 Model Primitives
The model as speciﬁed is general enough to encompass numerous applied problems in economics. Indeed,
similar models have been applied to advertising, auctions, collusion, consumer learning, environmental
policy, international trade policy, learning-by-doing, limit order markets, mergers, network externalities,
and other applied problems. To study any particular applied problem it is necessary to further specify the
primitives of the model, including:
6proﬁt function π
sell-off value distribution ∼ φit
investment impact function w
investment uncertainty distribution ∼ ζit
unit investment cost d
entry cost κ
discount factor β
Note that in most applied problems the proﬁt function would not be speciﬁed directly, but would instead
result from a deeper set of primitives that specify a demand function, a cost function, and a static equilibrium
concept. An important parameter of the demand function, that we will focus on below, is the size of the
relevant market, which we will denote as m.
2.3 Assumptions
We make several assumptions about the model primitives, beginning with the proﬁt function. An industry




z≥x s0(z). We will denote this
relation by s  s0. Intuitively, competition associated with s is no weaker than competition associated with
s0.
Assumption 2.1.
1. For all s ∈ S, π(x,s) is increasing in x.
2. For all x ∈ N and s,s0 ∈ S, if s  s0 then π(x,s) ≤ π(x,s0).
3. For all x ∈ N and s ∈ S, π(x,s) > 0, and supx,s π(x,s) < ∞.
4. For all x ∈ N, y ∈ N, and s ∈ S, π(x,s) is differentiable with respect to s(y). Further, for any























The assumptions are natural. Assumption 2.1.1 ensures that increases in quality lead to increases in
proﬁt. Assumption 2.1.2 states that strengthened competition cannot result in increased proﬁt. Assumption
2.1.3 ensures that proﬁts are positive and bounded. The ﬁrst part of Assumption 2.1.4 requires partial
differentiability of the proﬁt function with respect to each s(y). Proﬁt functions that are “smooth”, such
7as ones arising from random utility demand models like the logit model, will satisfy this assumption. The
second part of Assumption 2.1.4 is technical and essentially requires that the proﬁt function is Fr´ echet
differentiable.
We also make assumptions about investment and the distributions of the private shocks:
Assumption 2.2.
1. The variables {φit|t ≥ 0,i ≥ 1} are i.i.d. and have ﬁnite expectations and well-deﬁned density
functions with support <+.
2. The random variables {ζit|t ≥ 0,i ≥ 1} are i.i.d. and independent of {φit|t ≥ 0,i ≥ 1}.
3. For all ζ, w(ι,ζ) is nondecreasing in ι.
4. For all ι > 0, P[w(ι,ζi,t+1) > 0] > 0.
5. For all ι > 0, P[w(ι,ζi,t+1) = 0] > 0.
6. There exists a positive constant w ∈ N such that |w(ι,ζ)| ≤ w, for all (ι,ζ). There exists a positive
constant ι such that ιit < ι, ∀i,∀t.
7. For all k ∈ {−w,...,w}, P[w(ι,ζi,t+1) = k] is continuous in ι.
8. The transitions generated by w(ι,ζ) are unique investment choice admissible .
Assumptions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 imply that investment and exit outcomes are idiosyncratic conditional on
the state. Assumption 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 imply that investment is productive. Assumption 2.2.5 is used to
ensure the Markov chain that describes the industry evolution admits an invariant distribution (in particular,
to ensure it is aperiodic). Assumption 2.2.6 places a ﬁnite bound on how much progress can be made or lost
in a single period through investment. Assumption 2.2.7 ensures that the impact of investment on transition
probabilities is continuous. Assumption 2.2.8 is an assumption introduced by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2003) that ensures a unique solution to the ﬁrms’ investment decision problem. It is used to guarantee
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, and is satisﬁed by many of the commonly used speciﬁcations
in the literature.
We assume that there are a large number of potential entrants who play a symmetric mixed entry strategy.
In that case the number of actual entrants is well approximated by the Poisson distribution (see appendix for
a derivation of this result). This leads to the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.3.
1. The number of ﬁrms entering during period t is a Poisson random variable that is conditionally
independent of {φit,ζit|t ≥ 0,i ≥ 1}, conditioned on st.
2. κ > β· ¯ φ, where ¯ φ is the expected net present value of entering the market, investing zero each period,
and then exiting at an optimal stopping time.
8We denote the expected number of ﬁrms entering at industry state st, by λ(st). This state-dependent
entry rate will be endogenously determined, and our solution concept will require that it satisﬁes a zero
expected proﬁt condition. Modeling the number of entrants as a Poisson random variable has the advantage
that it leads to more elegant asymptotic results. Assumption 2.3.2 ensures that the sell-off value by itself is
not sufﬁcient reason to enter the industry.
2.4 Equilibrium
As a model of industry behavior we focus on pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), in the sense
of Maskin and Tirole (1988). We further assume that equilibrium is symmetric, such that all ﬁrms use a
common stationary investment/exit strategy. In particular, there is a function ι such that at each time t,
each incumbent ﬁrm i ∈ St invests an amount ιit = ι(xit,s−i,t). Similarly, each ﬁrm follows an exit
strategy that takes the form of a cutoff rule: there is a real-valued function ρ such that an incumbent ﬁrm
i ∈ St exits at time t if and only if φit ≥ ρ(xit,s−i,t). In the appendix we show that there always exists
an optimal exit strategy of this form even among very general classes of exit strategies. Let M denote
the set of exit/investment strategies such that an element µ ∈ M is a pair of functions µ = (ι,ρ), where
ι : N×S → <+ is an investment strategy and ρ : N×S → <+ is an exit strategy. Similarly, we denote the
set of entry rate functions by Λ, where an element of Λ is a function λ : S → <+.
We deﬁne the value function V (x,s|µ0,µ,λ) to be the expected net present value for a ﬁrm at state x
when its competitors’ state is s, given that its competitors each follows a common strategy µ ∈ M, the entry
rate function is λ ∈ Λ, and the ﬁrm itself follows strategy µ0 ∈ M. In particular,
V (x,s|µ0,µ,λ) = Eµ0,µ,λ
" τi X
k=t
βk−t (π(xik,s−i,k) − dιik) + βτi−tφi,τi

 xit = x,s−i,t = s
#
,
where i is taken to be the index of a ﬁrm at quality level x at time t, τi is a random variable representing the
time at which ﬁrm i exits the industry, and the subscripts of the expectation indicate the strategy followed
by ﬁrm i, the strategy followed by its competitors, and the entry rate function. In an abuse of notation, we
will use the shorthand, V (x,s|µ,λ) ≡ V (x,s|µ,µ,λ), to refer to the expected discounted value of proﬁts
when ﬁrm i follows the same strategy µ as its competitors.
An equilibrium to our model comprises an investment/exit strategy µ = (ι,ρ) ∈ M, and an entry rate
function λ ∈ Λ that satisfy the following conditions:
91. Incumbent ﬁrm strategies represent a MPE:
(2.1) sup
µ0∈M
V (x,s|µ0,µ,λ) = V (x,s|µ,λ) ∀x ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S.
2. At each state, either entrants have zero expected proﬁts or the entry rate is zero (or both):
P
s∈S λ(s)(βEµ,λ [V (xe,s−i,t+1|µ,λ)|st = s] − κ) = 0
βEµ,λ [V (xe,s−i,t+1|µ,λ)|st = s] − κ ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S
λ(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S.
In the appendix, we show that the supremum in part 1 of the deﬁnition above can always be attained simul-
taneously for all x and s by a common strategy µ0.
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2003) establish existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies for a closely
related model. We do not provide an existence proof here because it is long and cumbersome and would
replicate this previous work. With respect to uniqueness, in general we presume that our model may have
multiple equilibria.4
Dynamic programming algorithms can be used to optimize ﬁrm strategies, and equilibria to our model
can be computed via their iterative application. However, these algorithms require compute time and mem-
ory that grow proportionately with the number of relevant industry states, which is often intractable in
contexts of practical interest. This difﬁculty motivates our alternative approach.
3 Oblivious Equilibrium
We will propose a method for approximating MPE based on the idea that when there are a large number
of ﬁrms, simultaneous changes in individual ﬁrm quality levels can average out such that the normalized
industry state remains roughly constant over time. In this setting, each ﬁrm can potentially make near-
optimal decisions based only on its own quality level and the long run average industry state. With this
motivation, we consider restricting ﬁrm strategies so that each ﬁrm’s decisions depend only on the ﬁrm’s
quality level. We call such restricted strategies oblivious since they involve decisions made without full
knowledge of the circumstances — in particular, the state of the industry.
4Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2003) also provide an example of multiple equilibria in their closely related model.
103.1 Oblivious Strategies and Entry Rate Functions
Let ˜ M ⊂ M and ˜ Λ ⊂ Λ denote the set of oblivious strategies and the set of oblivious entry rate functions.
Since each strategy µ = (ι,ρ) ∈ ˜ M generates decisions ι(x,s) and ρ(x,s) that do not depend on s, with
some abuse of notation, we will often drop the second argument and write ι(x) and ρ(x). Similarly, for an
entry rate function λ ∈ ˜ Λ, we will denote by λ the real-valued entry rate that persists for all industry states.
3.2 Oblivious Equilibrium
Note that if all ﬁrms use a common strategy µ ∈ ˜ M, the quality level of each evolves as an independent tran-
sient Markov chain. Let the k-period transition sub-probabilities of this transient Markov chain be denoted
by Pk









µ(xe,x). Denote the expected number of ﬁrms at quality
level x at time t by ˜ st(x) = E[st(x)]. The following result offers an expression for the long-run expected
industry state when dynamics are governed by oblivious strategies and entry rate functions.
Lemma 3.1. Let Assumption 2.2 hold. If ﬁrms make decisions according to an oblivious strategy µ ∈ ˜ M
and enter according to an oblivious entry rate function λ ∈ ˜ Λ, and the expected time that a ﬁrm spends in
the industry is ﬁnite, then
(3.1) lim
t→∞





for all x ∈ N.
We omit the proof, which is straightforward. To abbreviate notation, we let ˜ sµ,λ(x) = limt→∞ ˜ st(x) for
µ ∈ ˜ M, λ ∈ ˜ Λ, and x ∈ N. For an oblivious strategy µ ∈ ˜ M and an oblivious entry rate function λ ∈ ˜ Λ
we deﬁne an oblivious value function
˜ V (x|µ0,µ,λ) = Eµ0
" τi X
k=t
βk−t (π(xik, ˜ sµ,λ) − dιik) + βτi−tφi,τi

 xit = x
#
.
This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of a ﬁrm that is at quality level
x and follows oblivious strategy µ0, under the assumption that its competitors’ state will be ˜ sµ,λ for all
time. Note that only the ﬁrm’s own strategy µ0 inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s state trajectory because neither the
proﬁt function nor the strategy µ0 depends on the industry state. Hence, the subscript in the expectation
only reﬂects this dependence. Importantly, however, the oblivious value function remains a function of
11the competitors’ strategy µ and the entry rate λ through the expected industry state ˜ sµ,λ. Again, we abuse
notation by using ˜ V (x|µ,λ) ≡ ˜ V (x|µ,µ,λ) to refer to the oblivious value function when ﬁrm i follows the
same strategy µ as its competitors.
We now deﬁne a new solution concept: an oblivious equilibrium consists of a strategy µ ∈ ˜ M and an
entry rate function λ ∈ ˜ Λ that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Firm strategies optimize an oblivious value function:
(3.2) sup
µ0∈ ˜ M
˜ V (x|µ0,µ,λ) = ˜ V (x|µ,λ), ∀x ∈ N.
2. Either the oblivious expected value of entry is zero or the entry rate is zero (or both):
λ

β ˜ V (xe|µ,λ) − κ

= 0
β ˜ V (xe|µ,λ) − κ ≤ 0
λ ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to show that an oblivious equilibrium exists under mild technical conditions. Fur-
thermore, if the entry cost is not prohibitively high then an oblivious equilibrium with a positive entry rate
exists. We omit the proof of this for brevity. With respect to uniqueness, we have been unable to ﬁnd mul-
tiple oblivious equilibria in any of the applied problems we have considered, but similarly with the case of
MPE, we have no reason to believe that in general there is a unique oblivious equilibrium.5
Note that we assume that, even if ﬁrms are using oblivious strategies, the sequence of single-period
proﬁts received are the ones associated with Nash, and not oblivious, static behavior. For example, if single-
period proﬁts are derived from a game in which ﬁrms compete in prices, we assume ﬁrms price according to
Nash equilibrium strategies, and are not oblivious with respect to pricing behavior. We make this assumption
because we are interested in the dynamic behavior of the industry, and we believe that assuming oblivious
pricing behavior, which would be cumbersome, would not change our conclusions in that respect.
We will later explore situations where the number of ﬁrms is large and oblivious equilibria approximate
MPE, in a sense that we will deﬁne precisely. First, we analyze the long-run behavior of an industry where
strategies and the entry rate function are oblivious.
5However, since oblivious strategies rule out strategies that are dependent on competitors’ states, there are likely to be fewer
oblivious equilibria than there are MPE.
123.3 The Invariant Industry Distribution
In Lemma 3.1, we characterized the long-run expected industry state. Our next result characterizes the
long-run distribution. The symbol ⇒ denotes weak convergence as t → ∞.
Lemma 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 hold. Assume that ﬁrms follow a common oblivious strategy
µ ∈ ˜ M, the expected entry rate is λ ∈ ˜ Λ, and the expected time that each ﬁrm spends in the industry is ﬁnite.
Let {Zx : x ∈ N} be a sequence of independent Poisson random variables with means {˜ sµ,λ(x) : x ∈ N},
and let Z be a Poisson random variable with mean
P
x∈N ˜ sµ,λ(x). Then,
(a) {st : t ≥ 0} is an irreducible, aperiodic and positive recurrent Markov chain;
(b) the invariant distribution of st is a product form of Poisson random variables;
(c) for all x, st(x) ⇒ Zx;
(d) nt ⇒ Z.








where 1A denotes the indicator of event A. Hence, for example, 1{xit=x} = 1 if xit = x, and 1{xit=x} = 0,
otherwise. {x(j)t : j = 1,...,nt} is a random permutation of {xit : i ∈ St}. That is, we randomly pick a
ﬁrm from St and assign to it the index j = 1; from the remaining ﬁrms we randomly pick another ﬁrm and
assign to it the index j = 2, and so on.
Lemma 3.3. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 hold. Assume that ﬁrms follow a common oblivious strategy
µ ∈ ˜ M, the expected entry rate is λ ∈ ˜ Λ, and the expected time that each ﬁrm spends in the industry is
ﬁnite. Let {Yn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of integer-valued i.i.d. random variables, each distributed according
to ˜ sµ,λ(·)/
P




 nt = n

⇒ (Y1,...,Yn).
Proofs of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 can be found in the appendix. The Poisson entry process is key to
proving these results. Lemma 3.3 ensures that if we sample a ﬁrm randomly from those ﬁrms currently
in the industry and the industry state is distributed according to the invariant distribution, the ﬁrm’s state
will be distributed according to the normalized expected industry state. Further, each subsequent time we
sample without replacement we get an independent sample from the same distribution. For brevity, when
13we consider sampling a random ﬁrm from among those currently in the industry and the industry state is
distributed according to the invariant distribution, we will say that we are sampling a ﬁrm from the industry’s
invariant distribution.
It is straightforward to show that if per-period proﬁt is bounded, say by some quantity π, then the
expected time a ﬁrm spends in the industry is ﬁnite for any oblivious strategy µ ∈ ˜ M that comprises
an oblivious equilibrium. This follows from the fact that the sell-off value has support in <+ and the
continuation value from every state is bounded above by π
1−β + φ. Hence, the probability of exiting in each
period is bounded below by a positive constant. This implies that the previous lemmas apply when ﬁrms use
oblivious equilibrium strategies.
4 Asymptotic Results
In this section, we establish asymptotic results that provide conditions under which oblivious equilibria offer
close approximations to MPE as the market size grows. As speciﬁed above, our model does not explicitly
depend on market size. However, market size would typically enter the proﬁt function, π(xit,s−i,t), through
the underlying demand system; in particular, proﬁt for a ﬁrm at a given state (x,s) would typically increase
with market size. Therefore, in this section we consider a sequence of markets indexed by market sizes
m ∈ <+. All other model primitives are assumed to remain constant within this sequence except for the
proﬁt function, which depends on m. To convey this dependence, we denote proﬁt functions by πm.
We index functions and random variables associated with market size m with a superscript (m). From
this point onward we let (˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) denote an oblivious equilibrium for market size m. Let V (m) and ˜ V (m)
represent the value function and oblivious value function, respectively, when the market size is m. To further
abbreviate notation we denote the expected industry state associated with (˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) by ˜ s(m) ≡ ˜ s˜ µ(m),˜ λ(m).
The random variable s
(m)
t denotes the industry state at time t when every ﬁrm uses strategy ˜ µ(m) and
the entry rate is ˜ λ(m). We denote the invariant distribution of {s
(m)
t : t ≥ 0} by q(m). In order to simplify
our analysis, we assume that the initial industry state s
(m)
0 is sampled from q(m). Hence, s
(m)
t is a stationary
process; s
(m)
t isdistributedaccordingtoq(m) forallt ≥ 0. Notethatthisassumptiondoesnotaffectlong-run
asymptotic results since for any initial condition the process approaches stationarity as time progresses.
It will be helpful to decompose s
(m)






t , where f
(m)
t is the random vec-
tor that represents the fraction of ﬁrms in each state and n
(m)
t is the total number of ﬁrms, respectively.
Similarly, let ˜ f(m) ≡ E[f
(m)




x∈N ˜ s(m)(x) denote the expected number of ﬁrms. Using Lemma 3.3, it is easy to check that ˜ f(m) = ˜ s(m)
˜ n(m).
With some abuse of notation, we deﬁne πm(xit,f−i,t,n−i,t) ≡ πm(xit,n−i,t · f−i,t).
4.1 Assumptions about the Sequence of Proﬁt Functions
In addition to Assumption 2.1, which applies to individual proﬁt functions, we will make the following
assumptions, which apply to sequences of proﬁt functions. Let S1 = {f ∈ S|
P
x∈N f(x) = 1} and
S1,z = {f ∈ S1|∀x > z,f(x) = 0}.
Assumption 4.1.
1. supx∈N,s∈S πm(x,s) = O(m). 6
2. For all increasing sequences {mk ∈ N|k ∈ N}, n : N 7→ N with n(mk) = o(mk), x,z ∈ N with










  < ∞.
The assumptions are again natural. Assumption 4.1.1, which states that proﬁts increase at most linearly
with market size, should hold for virtually all relevant classes of proﬁt functions. It is satisﬁed, for example,
if the total disposable income of the consumer population grows linearly in market size.7 Assumption 4.1.2
is also natural. It states that if the number of ﬁrms grows slower than the market size then the largest ﬁrm’s
proﬁt becomes arbitrarily large as the market grows. Assumption 4.1.3 requires that proﬁts are “smooth”
with respect to the number of ﬁrms and, in particular, states that the relative rate of change of proﬁt with
respect to relative changes in the number of ﬁrms is uniformly bounded. To provide a concrete example,
we show in Section 4.5 that these assumptions are satisﬁed by a single-period proﬁt function derived from a
demand system given by a logit model and where the spot market equilibrium is Nash in prices.
4.2 Asymptotic Markov Equilibrium
Our aim is to establish that, under certain conditions, oblivious equilibria well-approximate MPE as the
market size grows. We deﬁne the following concept to formalize the sense in which this approximation
becomes exact.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A sequence (˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) ∈ M × Λ possesses the asymptotic Markov equilibrium (AME)
6In this notation, f(m) = O(m) denotes limsupm
f(m)
m < ∞. f(m) = o(m) denotes limsupm
f(m)
m = 0.
7For example, if each consumer has income that is less than some upper bound ¯ Y then total disposable income of the consumer
population (an upper bound to ﬁrm proﬁts) is always less than m · ¯ Y .









t |µ0, ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) − V (m)(x,s
(m)
t |˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m))
#
= 0 .
Recall that the process st is taken to be stationary, and therefore, this expectation does not depend on t.
The deﬁnition of AME assesses approximation error at each ﬁrm state x in terms of the amount by which
a ﬁrm at state x can increase its expected net present value by deviating from the oblivious equilibrium
strategy ˜ µ(m), and instead following an optimal (non-oblivious) best response that keeps track of the true
industry state. Recall that a MPE requires that the expression in square brackets equals zero for all states
(x,s). In that sense, the notion of AME relates to the more common notion that -equilibria approximate
true equilibria in games as  → 0 (Fudenberg and Levine 1986).
Note that standard MPE solution algorithms (e.g., Pakes and McGuire (1994)) aim to compute point-
wise -equilibria; that is, where a ﬁrm cannot improve its net present value by more than  starting from
any state (x,s). The AME property instead considers the beneﬁt of deviating to an optimal strategy starting
from each ﬁrm state x, averaged over the invariant distribution of industry states. It would not be possible
to obtain our results point-wise. This is because in an oblivious equilibrium ﬁrms may be making poor
decisions in states that are far from the expected state. Offsetting this effect is the fact that these states have
very low probability of occurrence, so they have a small impact on expected discounted proﬁts.8
IfasequenceofobliviousequilibriahastheAMEpropertythen, asmgrows, supµ0∈M V (m)(x,s|µ0, ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) ≈
V (m)(x,s|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) for states s that have signiﬁcant probability of occurrence. This implies that, asymp-
totically, ˜ µ(m) is a near optimal strategy (so it approximately satisﬁes the MPE equation) when the industry
starts in any state that has signiﬁcant probability of occurrence. Additionally, one can show that when the
sequence of oblivious equilibria has the AME property then it is also the case that








= 0. Since β ˜ V (xe|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) =
κ for all m, asymptotically, βV (m)(xe,s|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) ≈ κ for states s that have signiﬁcant probability of





t |µ0, ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) − V (m)(x,s
(m)
t |˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m))
i
is small, MPE strategies
and entry rates at relevant states should be well approximated by oblivious ones. We will later present
computational results that support this point.9
8Note that Pakes and McGuire (2001) use a similar concept as a stopping rule in their stochastic algorithm.
9One might attempt to formalize this argument by following a similar line of reasoning as Fudenberg and Levine (1986) or
Altman, Pourtallier, Haurie, and Moresino (2000), who provide conditions under which, if a sequence of restricted games, Gm,
converges to a game of interest, G, in an appropriate way, then any convergent sequence of m−equilibria of Gm with m → 0
converges to an equilibrium of G. Our model does not have a well deﬁned limit game, which makes it hard to apply this argument.
164.3 Uniform Law of Large Numbers
Thefollowing theoremestablishesthat whenthenumber ofﬁrmsis large, theindustry statebecomesapprox-
imately constant (i.e., s
(m)
t ≈ ˜ s(m)) with high probability. We use →p to denote convergence in probability
as m → ∞.












  →p 0.
The theorem can be proved by invoking a uniform law of large numbers (Vapnik and Chervonenkis
(1971))andusingLemma3.3. Itsuggeststhatwhentheexpectednumberofﬁrmsislarge, usinganoblivious
strategy might be close to optimal, and that a sequence of oblivious equilibria possesses the AME property.
However, for this to be the case it turns out that additional conditions are required.
4.4 A Light-Tail Condition Implies AME
Even when there are a large number of ﬁrms, if the market tends to be concentrated — for example, if the
market is usually dominated by a single ﬁrm — the AME property is unlikely to hold. To ensure the AME
property, we need to impose a “light-tail” condition that rules out this kind of market concentration.
Note that
dlnπm(y,f,n)
df(x) is the semi-elasticity of one period proﬁts with respect to the fraction of ﬁrms in











For each x, g(x) is the maximum rate of relative change of any ﬁrm’s single-period proﬁt that could result
from a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms at quality level x. Since larger competitors tend to have greater
inﬂuence on ﬁrm proﬁts, g(x) typically increases with x, and can be unbounded.
Finally, we introduce our light-tail condition. For each m, let ˜ x(m) ∼ ˜ f(m), that is, ˜ x(m) is a random
variable with probability mass function ˜ f(m). According to Lemma 3.3, ˜ x(m) can be interpreted as the
quality level of a ﬁrm that is randomly sampled from among all incumbents while the industry state is
distributed according to its invariant distribution.






17for all market sizes m.
Put simply, the light tail condition requires that states where a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms has
a large impact on the proﬁts of other ﬁrms, must have a small probability under the invariant distribution.
In practice this typically means that very large ﬁrms (and hence high concentration) rarely occur under the
invariant distribution.
Recall that g(x) is the maximum rate of relative change of any ﬁrm’s single-period proﬁt that could
result from a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms at quality level x. The ﬁrst part of the assumption requires
that for any x, this quantity is ﬁnite. If this condition is not satisﬁed, a small change in the number of ﬁrms
at quality level x can have an arbitrarily large impact on other ﬁrms’ proﬁts as the market size grows. It
is unlikely that an oblivious equilibrium will provide a good approximation in this situation. Note that the
assumption imposes that g(x) is ﬁnite for each x, but allows g(x) to grow arbitrarily large as x grows.
To interpret the second part of the assumption it is helpful to ﬁrst understand a weaker condition:
E[g(˜ x(m))] < ∞. This weakercondition ensuresthat theexpected impactof arandomly sampledincumbent
is ﬁnite. It can be viewed as a “light tail” condition, since it requires that the probability of sampling ﬁrms at
large quality levels dies off sufﬁciently quickly so that the expected impact remains ﬁnite. For any x and z,
the product g(x)1{x>z} is equal to 0 if x ≤ z but otherwise is equal to g(x). Hence, E[g(˜ x(m))1{˜ x(m)>z}]
is similar to E[g(˜ x(m))] but ignores the impact of any sampled ﬁrm if its quality level is z or lower. Con-
sequently, E[g(˜ x(m))1{˜ x(m)>z}] bounds the expected impact of the presence of a randomly sampled ﬁrm if
the impact of any ﬁrm with quality level z or lower is ignored.
It is easy to see that the condition E[g(˜ x(m))] < ∞ is equivalent to a condition that, for any  > 0, there
exists a quality level z such that E[g(˜ x(m))1{˜ x(m)>z}] ≤ . This is because increasing z sufﬁciently will
result in ignoring a larger and larger fraction of ﬁrms in computing the expected impact and the expected im-
pact when none of the ﬁrms is ignored is ﬁnite. Assumption 4.2 poses a stronger condition in that it requires




≤  for all market sizes m simultane-
ously. This is like the “light tail condition” E[g(˜ x(m))1{˜ x(m)>z}] ≤ , or equivalently E[g(˜ x(m))] < ∞,
which applies to a ﬁxed market size, but it precludes the possibility that the tail becomes arbitrarily “fat”
as the market size increases. In a sense, it requires that the tails of quality distributions ˜ f(m) are uniformly
“light” over market sizes m.
Asanalternativemotivationforthelight-tailcondition, wenotethatifg(x)isincreasingandunbounded,
then if there exists γ > 0, such that, supm E[g
 
˜ x(m)1+γ
] < ∞, Assumption 4.2 is satisﬁed. The condition
is slightly stronger than requiring uniformly bounded ﬁrst moments of g(˜ x(m)).
The following theorem establishes that, asymptotically, the average number of ﬁrms grows at least
18linearly in the market size.
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1.2, and 4.2, ˜ n(m) = Ω(m) 10.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The intuition behind the result is simple. If the number of ﬁrms
were to grow slower than the market size, proﬁts would blow up and the zero proﬁt condition at the entry
state would not be met.
The next result, which is also proved in the appendix, establishes a stronger form of convergence than
Theorem 4.1. First, we deﬁne kfk1,g =
P
x |f(x)|g(x).
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1.2, and 4.2, hold. Then, as m grows, n
(m)
t /˜ n(m) →p 1 and
kf
(m)
t − ˜ f(m)k1,g →p 0.
This new form of convergence allows us to ensure the AME property, which leads to the main result of
this section.
Theorem 4.4. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1, and 4.2, the sequence {˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)} of oblivious equi-
libria possesses the AME property.
This result is proved in the appendix.
4.5 Example: Logit Demand System with Price Competition
To provide a concrete example of the conditions required for the asymptotic results above, we consider a
model where the single-period proﬁt function is derived from a demand system given by a logit model, and
where the spot market equilibrium is Nash in prices. The model is described in detail in Subsection 6.1,
where we use it for our computational simulations.
In the appendix we show that the single period proﬁt function implied by this model satisﬁes Assump-
tions 2.1 and 4.1. Furthermore, we show that, in this model, the function g(˜ x(m)) takes a very simple form,
g(˜ x(m)) ≈ (˜ x(m))θ1,
where θ1 is the parameter on quality in the logit demand model. Therefore, the light tail condition amounts
to a simple condition on the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm states. (Under our assumptions, such a condition
is equivalent to a condition on the equilibrium size distribution of ﬁrms.)
10In this notation, f(m) = Ω(m) implies that liminfm
f(m)
m > 0. With an additional technical regularity condition, it is
straightforward to show that ˜ n
(m) = O(m). Hence, it must be that, asymptotically, ˜ n
(m) grows linearly in m.
19Thelighttailconditionrequiresthatforall > 0, thereexistsaqualitylevelz suchthatE
h 
˜ x(m)θ1 1{˜ x(m)>z}
i
≤
, for all market sizes m. If θ1 < 1 then the light-tail condition is satisﬁed if supm E

˜ x(m)
< ∞, i.e., if
the average ﬁrm quality level remains uniformly bounded over all market sizes. This condition allows for
relatively “fat-tailed” distributions. For example, if ˜ x(m) converges in distribution to a log-normal distribu-
tion, then the light-tail condition is satisﬁed. On the other hand, if ˜ x(m) converges to a Pareto distribution
with parameter one (which does not have a ﬁnite ﬁrst moment), then the light-tail condition would not be
satisﬁed.
5 Algorithm and Bounds
In this section we propose an algorithm that computes oblivious equilibria for a particular set of model
primitives. We then derive expressions that bound the approximation error associated with a particular
oblivious equilibrium. While the asymptotic results from Section 4 provide conditions under which the
approximation will work well as the market size grows, the error bound can be used to evaluate the oblivious
equilibrium as an approximation for MPE for a particular set of model primitives.
5.1 Computing Oblivious Equilibria
Algorithm 1 (below) is designed to compute an oblivious equilibrium. It starts with two extreme entry rates:




1−β + ¯ φ

. Under mild assumptions, any oblivious equilibrium entry rate must
lie between these two extremes. The algorithm searches over entry rates between these two extremes for one
that leads to an oblivious equilibrium.11 For each candidate entry rate λ, an inner loop (lines 5-8) computes
an oblivious equilibrium ﬁrm strategy for that ﬁxed entry rate. If the termination conditions of both the inner
and outer loops are satisﬁed with 1 = 2 = 0, we have an oblivious equilibrium. Small values of 1 and 2
allow for small errors associated with limitations of numerical precision.
The algorithm is easy to program and computationally efﬁcient. In each iteration of the inner loop, the
optimization problem to be solved is a one dimensional dynamic program. The state space in this dynamic
program is the set of quality levels a ﬁrm can achieve. In principle, there could be an inﬁnite number of
them. However, beyond a certain quality level the optimal strategy for a ﬁrm is not to invest, so its quality
cannot increase to beyond that level. In the numerical experiments we present in Section 6, the state space
11Note that there are potentially many alternative methods for searching over entry rates for an oblivious equilibrium. For
example, one alternative would be to start at an arbitrary entry rate and then implement small increments and decrements to the
entry rate until an entry rate is found that leads to an oblivious equilibrium.
20Algorithm 1 Oblivious Equilibrium Solver
1: λ := 0; λ := supx,s π(x,s)/κ
2: µ(x) := 0 for all x
3: repeat
4: λ := (λ + λ)/2
5: repeat
6: µ0 := µ
7: Choose µ ∈ ˜ M to maximize ˜ V (x|µ,µ0,λ) simultaneously for all x ∈ N
8: until kµ − µ0k∞ ≤ 1
9: if β ˜ V (xe|µ,λ) − κ ≥ 0 then
10: λ := λ
11: else
12: λ := λ
13: end if
14: until |β ˜ V (xe|µ,λ) − κ| ≤ 2
never had more than two hundred states per ﬁrm. The exact number of states is determined during execution
of the algorithm.
Whether this algorithm is guaranteed to terminate in a ﬁnite number of iterations remains an open issue.
However, in over 90% of the numerical experiments we present in the next section, it converged in less than
ﬁve minutes (and often much less than this). In the rest, it converged in less than ﬁfteen minutes.12
5.2 Error Bounds
To bound approximation error, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne what is meant by approximation error. Consider an
oblivious strategy and entry rate function (˜ µ, ˜ λ) ∈ ˜ M × ˜ Λ. We will quantify approximation error at each





V (x,st|µ0, ˜ µ, ˜ λ) − V (x,st|˜ µ, ˜ λ)
#
.
The expectation is over the invariant distribution of st. Hence, approximation error is the amount by which
a ﬁrm at state x ∈ N can improve its expected net present value by unilaterally deviating from the oblivious
equilibrium strategy ˜ µ, and instead following an optimal (non-oblivious) best response, averaged over com-
petitor states drawn from the invariant industry state distribution. Recall that the AME property required
that the approximation error converge to zero as market size grows.
The next theorem provides two bounds on the approximation error. Recall that ˜ s is the long run expected
state in oblivious equilibrium (E[st]). Let ax(y) be the expected discounted sum of an indicator of visits to
12The algorithm was programmed in Matlab. The experiments were executed on two UNIX shared machines. A Sun Enterprise
6500, Solaris 2.8, with 16 GB RAM, 12 GB swap, and 18 GB tmp; and a Sun Enterprise 5500, Solaris 8, with 4 GB RAM, 4 GB
swap, and 8.7 GB tmp.
21state y for a ﬁrm starting at state x that uses strategy ˜ µ .
Theorem 5.1. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any oblivious equilibrium (˜ µ, ˜ λ) and ﬁrm

























ax(y)(π(y, ˜ s) − E [π(y,st)]),
where ∆π(s) = maxy∈N (π(y,s) − π(y, ˜ s)).
The derivation of these bounds can be found in the appendix. It is worth mentioning that the result can
be generalized a great deal. In particular, most of the prior assumptions can be dropped; for instance, most
alternative entry processes will not change the result. In the next subsection we show that the bounds can be
obtained even for models that incorporate common aggregate shocks to proﬁts.
The ﬁrst bound is simpler so we will use it to build the intuition behind the bounds. According to the
ﬁrst bound, if one period proﬁts when the state is sampled from the invariant distribution are close to one
period proﬁts evaluated at the expected state, then the oblivious equilibrium offers a close approximation.
This is because, in that case, ﬁrms cannot improve their expected discounted proﬁts much by unilaterally
deviating from the oblivious strategy and keeping track of the industry state.
The second bound is more involved. We provide it because it is much tighter. Note that the right-hand-
side of the second bound depends on the initial ﬁrm state x, whereas the right-hand-side of the ﬁrst bound
does not.
Both bounds can be easily estimated via simulation algorithms. Computing the bounds involves com-
puting an expectation over the industry state st. Once the oblivious equilibrium has been computed, the
industry state has a known distribution, namely, the product form of Poisson random variables with mean
˜ s (by Lemma 3.2). In particular, note that the bounds are not a function of the true MPE or even of the
optimal non-oblivious best response strategy. Computing either of these strategies could require solving a
high-dimensional dynamic program.
In our computational experiments, we also make use of a stronger bound that applies when the quality
level of a ﬁrm can change by at most one unit per time period ( ¯ w = 1), a common feature of EP-type models.
22Theorem 5.2. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Further, assume that the quality level of any ﬁrm can
change by at most one unit per time period. Then, for any oblivious equilibrium (˜ µ, ˜ λ), ﬁrm state x ∈ N,

















ax(y)(π(y, ˜ s) − E [π(y,st)]) . (5.3)
where ∆Aπ(s) = maxy∈A (π(y,s) − π(y, ˜ s)), A = {0,...,a − 1} and x ∈ A.
The proof of this result is similar to that of Theorem 5.1 and is omitted. In general, E [π(y,s)] −
π(y, ˜ s) ≥ 0 and is increasing in y. Therefore, E [maxy∈A (π(y,s) − π(y, ˜ s))] increases as the set A in-
creases, making the ﬁrst term of our previous bound (5.2) large. In this new bound (5.3), the term that
involves maxy∈Ac is the larger one because it involves the maximum over the larger states. However, this
is offset by the factor of βa−x. The term βa−x appears because it takes at least a − x periods to transition
from state x to any state in Ac. When using this bound in the computational experiments, we choose the set
A to minimize the right-hand-side.
5.3 Error Bounds in a Model with Aggregate Proﬁt Shocks
Because the model above contains only idiosyncratic shocks, it is limited in its ability to capture the kind
of industry wide business cycles that are often observed in real world industries. To address this issue, in
this subsection we extend the error bounds to a model with a proﬁt shock, zt, that is common to all ﬁrms in
the industry. zt might represent a common demand shock, a common shock to input prices, or a common
technology shock. These common shocks will serve to generate periods over which proﬁts are high (or low)
for all ﬁrms in the industry simultaneously. Note that these shocks will result in an industry that experiences
some variation even if the number of ﬁrms becomes large. Therefore, the asymptotic results in the previous
section will not hold in this model. However, we can still obtain bounds on the approximation error for any
given set of model primitives, and it may be that these bounds are small, such that the approximation would
still be useful in practice.
The following assumption deﬁnes the aggregate shock process and restates the assumptions on the proﬁt
function.13
13Note that for simplicity we model the aggregate shock as an integer. However, it does not change anything to make zt a vector.
23Assumption 5.1. Let Z = {zt ∈ N : t ≥ 0} be a stationary Markov process with a well deﬁned invariant
distribution. Single-period proﬁts for ﬁrm i at time t are given by π(xit,s−i,t,zt). For all z, π(x,s,z)
satisﬁes Assumption 2.1. Additionally, supx,s,z π(x,s,z) < ∞.
In this model, a strategy is a function µ(x,s,z) that depends on the ﬁrm’s own state, the competi-
tors’ state and the level of the aggregate shock. An entry rate is a function, λ(s,z), that depends on
the industry state and the level of the aggregate shock. To formalize these notions, let Mz denote the
set of exit/investment strategies such that an element µ ∈ Mz is a pair of functions µ = (ι,ρ), where
ι : N × S × N → <+ is an investment strategy and ρ : N × S × N → <+ is an exit strategy. We denote the
set of entry rate functions by Λz, where an element of Λ is a function λ : S × N → <+.
Deﬁne the value function, V (x,s,z|µ0,µ,λ), to be the expected net present value for a ﬁrm at state x
when its competitors’ state is s, and the value of the aggregate shock is z, given that its competitors each
follow a common strategy µ ∈ Mz, the entry rate function is λ ∈ Λz, and the ﬁrm itself follows strategy
µ0 ∈ Mz. Because this deﬁnition is analogous to the one in section 2.4, we omit the details here for brevity.
An equilibrium in this model comprises an investment/exit strategy µ = (ι,ρ) ∈ Mz, and an entry rate
function λ ∈ Λz such that:
1. Incumbent ﬁrm strategies represent a MPE:
sup
µ0∈Mz
V (x,s,z|µ0,µ,λ) = V (x,s,z|µ,λ) ∀x ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S, ∀z ∈ N.
2. At each state, either entrants have zero expected proﬁts or the entry rate is zero (or both):
P
s∈S, z∈N λ(s,z)(βEµ,λ [V (xe,s−i,t+1,zt+1|µ,λ)|st = s, zt = z] − κ) = 0
βEµ,λ [V (xe,s−i,t+1,zt+1|µ,λ)|st = s, zt = z] − κ ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S, ∀z ∈ N
λ(s,z) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, ∀z ∈ N.
Because the aggregate shocks are likely to be of ﬁrst order importance to strategies, in extending the notion
of oblivious strategies to this model it makes sense to make strategies a function of the current value of the
shock. Thus, an oblivious strategy in this model will be a function µ ∈ Mz such that, for all x,z ∈ N and
s,s0 ∈ S, µ(x,s,z) = µ(x,s0,z). That is, ﬁrms’ strategies are functions only of their own state and the
level of the aggregate shock. Similarly, an oblivious entry rate in this model is a function λ ∈ Λz such that,
for all z ∈ N and s,s0 ∈ S, λ(s,z) = λ(s0,z). That is, the oblivious entry rate is a function only of the level
of the aggregate shock. Let ˜ Mz ⊂ Mz and ˜ Λz ⊂ Λz denote the set of oblivious strategies and the set of
24oblivious entry rate functions respectively.
Let ˜ sµ,λ be the long-run expected industry state when dynamics are governed by oblivious strategy µ
and oblivious entry rate function λ. We deﬁne an oblivious value function as,
˜ V (x,z|µ0,µ,λ) = Eµ0
" τi X
k=t
βk−t (π(xik, ˜ sµ,λ,zk) − dιik) + βτi−tφi,τi

 xit = x,zt = z
#
.
This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of a ﬁrm that is at quality level x
when the aggregate shock has value z and the ﬁrm follows oblivious strategy µ0, under the assumption that
its competitors’ state will be ˜ sµ,λ for all time.
An oblivious equilibrium consists of a strategy µ ∈ ˜ Mz and an entry rate function λ ∈ ˜ Λz that satisfy
the following conditions:
1. Firm strategies optimize an oblivious value function:
sup
µ0∈ ˜ Mz
˜ V (x,z|µ0,µ,λ) = ˜ V (x,z|µ,λ), ∀x ∈ N, ∀z ∈ N.

















 zt = z
i
− κ ≤ 0, ∀z ∈ N
λ(z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ N.
We now introduce the error bound for this model,
Corollary 5.1. Let Assumption 5.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any oblivious equilibrium (˜ µ, ˜ λ), and ﬁrm











where ∆|˜ π|(s,z) = maxy∈N |π(y,s,z) − π(y, ˜ s˜ µ,˜ λ,z)|, and the expectations is taken over the invariant
distribution of (st,zt).
The proof is analogous to Theorem 5.1 and is therefore omitted. In addition, as above, this bound is
quite general and does not rely on many of the detailed modeling assumptions. Finally, as in Theorems 5.1
and 5.2 tighter versions of the bound can be obtained.
256 Computational Experiments
In this section we conduct some computational experiments to evaluate how oblivious equilibrium performs
in practice, and also to demonstrate the range of applications that are possible using our methods. We begin
with the model to be analyzed. The model is similar to Pakes and McGuire (1994). However, it differs in
the entry and exit processes, in the demand system, and in that we do not consider a common shock.
6.1 The Computational Model
SINGLE-PERIOD PROFIT FUNCTION. We consider an industry with differentiated products, where each
ﬁrm’s state variable represents the quality of its product. There are m consumers in the market. In period t,
consumer j receives utility uijt from consuming the good produced by ﬁrm i given by:
uijt = θ1 ln(
xit
ψ
+ 1) + θ2 ln(Y − pit) + νijt , i ∈ St, j = 1,...,m,
where Y is the consumer’s income, pit is the price of the good produced by ﬁrm i, and ψ is a scaling
factor. νijt are i.i.d. random variables distributed Gumbel that represent unobserved characteristics for
each consumer-good pair. There is also an outside good that provides consumers zero utility. We assume
consumers buy at most one product each period and that they choose the product that maximizes utility.
Under these assumptions our demand system is a classical logit model.
Let N(xit,pit) = exp(θ1 ln(xit







, ∀i ∈ St .
Weassumethatﬁrmssetpricesinthespotmarket. Ifthereisaconstantmarginalcostc, theNashequilibrium
of the pricing game satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions,
(6.1) Y − pit + θ2(pit − c)(σ(xit,s−i,t,pt) − 1) = 0 , ∀i ∈ St .
There is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, denoted p∗
t (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)). Expected
proﬁts are given by:
πm(xit,s−i,t) = mσ(xit,s−i,t,p∗
t)(p∗
it − c) , ∀i ∈ St .
SELL-OFF PRICE. φit are i.i.d. exponential random variables with mean K.
TRANSITION DYNAMICS. A ﬁrm’s investment is successful with probability aι
1+aι, in which case the quality
26of its product increases by one level. The ﬁrm’s product depreciates one quality level with probability δ,
independently each period. Note that our model differs from Pakes and McGuire (1994) here because the
depreciation shocks in our model are idiosyncratic. Combining the investment and depreciation processes,
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(1−δ)aι
1+aι if y = x + 1
(1−δ)+δaι
1+aι if y = x
δ
1+aι if y = x − 1 .
6.2 Numerical Results: Behavior of the Bound
Our ﬁrst set of results investigate the behavior of the approximation error bound under several different
model speciﬁcations. A wide range of parameters for our model could reasonably represent different real
world industries of interest. In practice the parameters would either be estimated using data from a particular
industry or chosen to reﬂect an industry under study. We begin by investigating a particular set of represen-
tative parameter values. Following Pakes and McGuire (1994) we ﬁx a = 3 and δ = 0.7. Additionally, we
ﬁx marginal cost at c = 0.5, income at Y = 1, θ2 = 0.5, and ψ = 1. The discount factor is β = 0.95. The
entry cost is κ = 35 and the entry state is xe = 10. The average sell-off value is K = 10. In this case,
β · φ < κ, so the sell-off value by itself is not sufﬁcient reason to enter the industry (assumption 2.3.2).
Additionally, both sell-off values and entry costs are substantially larger than marginal costs, consistent with
empirical evidence.
In our computational experiments we found that the most important parameter affecting the approxima-
tion error bounds was θ1, which determines the importance that consumers place on product quality. If θ1 is
small, the degree of vertical differentiation between products is small. This reduces the impact of changes
in the industry state on proﬁts, making the MPE strategies less sensitive to the industry state. Additionally,
when θ1 is small it turns out that the invariant distribution ˜ s is very “light-tailed”. Oblivious strategies work
well in this case, and the approximation error bound is small. If θ1 is large, we get the reverse implications
and the approximation error bound is larger.
Based on these experiments, here we consider two different values of θ1 and the investment cost d:
(θ1,d): (0.1, 0.1)and(0.5, 0.5). Theformer(“Low”)isasituationwherethelevelofverticaldifferentiation
is low and it is inexpensive to invest to improve quality. The latter (“High”) is the opposite. As a point of
comparison, if a ﬁrm increases its state from x = 10 to x = 20, its single-period proﬁts increase by 7% and
40% respectively in the two cases (holding competitors constant).
27For each set of parameters, we use the approximation error bound in Theorem 5.2 to compute an upper
bound on the percentage error in the value function,
E[supµ0∈M V (x,s|µ0,˜ µ,˜ λ)−V (x,s|˜ µ,˜ λ)]
E[V (x,s|˜ µ,˜ λ)]] , where (˜ µ, ˜ λ) are the
OE strategy and entry rate, respectively, and the expectations are taken with respect to s. We estimate the
expectations using simulation.14 We compute the previously mentioned percentage approximation error
bound for different market sizes. As the market size increases, the expected number of ﬁrms increases and
the approximation error bound decreases.
In Figure 1 we present the percentage approximation error bound as a function of the expected number
of ﬁrms for the two levels of vertical differentiation (the two curves are obtained by varying the market size).
For the low vertical differentiation case it takes around 60 ﬁrms to bring the bound down to 2%, and 250
ﬁrms to bring it below 1%. For the high case it takes around 250 ﬁrms to bring the bound to 5% and 1000
ﬁrms to bring it near 2%.
When the level of vertical differentiation is high, the number of ﬁrms required to have a good approxi-
mation is large, requiring hundreds and even thousands of ﬁrms. The approximation would be better if the
industry state s were always close to its mean, ˜ s. One aspect of the model that interferes with this is the
Poisson entry process, which leads to a large amount of variability in the number of ﬁrms inside the industry.
Recall that we chose to model the entry process this way because it facilitated the asymptotic arguments in
Section 4. However, the expressions for the approximation error bounds remain correct for a wide range
of entry models. To investigate this issue further, as an alternative, we tried using an entry process where
the number of entrants each period is deterministic, but still satisﬁes a zero proﬁts condition.15 This entry
process implies a smaller variability in the number of ﬁrms.
Figure 2 presents the results with the new entry process. In the case of low vertical differentiation, the
approximation error bound is less than 2% with just 30 ﬁrms and it is around 1% with 100 ﬁrms. When the
level of vertical differentiation is high the approximation error bound is around 5% when there are 120 ﬁrms
and around 2% for 700 ﬁrms.
Going one step further in reducing the variability of the industry dynamics, we tried shutting down entry
and exit altogether and considered an industry with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. This situation can be viewed as
a particular case of the model presented in Section 2, with a constant sell-off value equal to zero and a very
14The expected value function is estimated with a relative precision of 1% and a conﬁdence level of 99%. The bound is estimated
with a relative precision of at most 10% and a conﬁdence level of 99% (in cases where the bound is very small it is difﬁcult to
achieve better precision than this). Note that the percentage approximation error bound depends on the state x so for the purposes of
this section we consider the percentage bound evaluated at the entry state. For the computations we took the maximum achievable
state, ˜ xmax, to be a state such that the expected number of visits of a ﬁrm using ˜ µ was at most 10
−5. In computing the bounds, we
conservatively assumed that the maximum achievable state under the best response (non-oblivious) strategy was 2˜ xmax.
15Note that the zero proﬁts condition typically requires a fractional number of entrants to be satisﬁed exactly, so to accommodate
this we instead randomized the number of entrants between the two neighboring integers. For example, if the equilibrium entry rate
is 2.5, then the number of entrants is 2 or 3 with probability 0.5. Allowing for fractional numbers ensures existence of equilibrium.
28high entry cost. See Figure 3 for the results.16 For the low case the approximation error bound is less than
0.5% with just 5 ﬁrms, while for the high case it is 5% for 5 ﬁrms, less than 3% with 40 ﬁrms, and less than
1% with 400 ﬁrms.
Most economic applications would involve from less than ten to several hundred ﬁrms. These results
show that the approximation error bound may sometimes be small (<2%) in these cases, though this would
depend on the model and parameter values for the industry under study.
6.3 Closeness to Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Having gained some insight into what features of the model lead to low values of the approximation error
bound, the question arises as to what value of the error bounds is required to obtain a good approximation.
To shed light on this issue we compare long-run statistics for the same industry primitives under oblivious
equilibrium and MPE strategies. A major constraint on this exercise is that it requires the ability to actually
compute the MPE. With the current algorithms we are able to compute MPE for industries with a maximum
of ﬁve to ten ﬁrms. Because we require the ability to compute equilibria for many different parameter values,
to keep computation manageable we use four ﬁrms here. We therefore limit our analysis to the case of a
ﬁxed number of ﬁrms (no entry and exit), because only for that case were the approximation error bounds
small under oblivious strategies (with only four ﬁrms). We use the same parameter speciﬁcations as in
the previous subsection. Because of computational constraints in computing the MPE, we also impose a
maximum state that a ﬁrm can reach of xmax = 15, at which point investment is assumed to have no further
effect. The market size is ﬁxed, m = 30.17
Recall that under oblivious equilibrium strategies, the industry state is described by an ergodic Markov
chain (Lemma 3.2). Under our assumptions, this is also true under MPE strategies (see also Ericson and
Pakes (1995)). Therefore, both systems have a well deﬁned invariant distribution that describes their long-
run behavior. We compare the average values of several economic statistics of interest under the oblivious
equilibrium and the MPE invariant distributions. The quantities compared are: average investment, average
producer surplus, average consumer surplus, average share of the largest ﬁrm (C1), and average share of the
largest two ﬁrms (C2). Table 1 reports these statistics for a wide range of parameters. The table also reports
the maximum value (across all states) and weighted average value of the approximation error bound, as well
as the maximum and weighted average of the actual beneﬁt from deviating and keeping track of the industry
state (the actual difference
E[supµ0∈M V (x,s|µ0,˜ µ,˜ λ)−V (x,s|˜ µ,˜ λ)]
E[V (x,s|˜ µ,˜ λ)]] ). Note that the the latter quantity should always
16Since now there is no entry state, we report the percentage error bound evaluated at the most visited state.
17The code used to compute MPE was generously provided by Uli Doraszelski.
29be smaller than the approximation error bound. In the results below we concentrate on the maximum values
of these quantities.
The table is separated into two groups. The ﬁrst ﬁve rows correspond to industries with a relatively
low cost of investment (low value of d relative to θ1). In these industries the industry state tends to have
a symmetric distribution (see Figure 4) reﬂecting a rich investment process. The last ﬁve rows of the table
correspond to industries with a relatively high cost of investment. In these industries the industry state tends
to be skewed (see Figure 5), reﬂecting low levels of investment.
From the computational experiments we conclude the following:
1. When the bound is less than 1% the long-run quantities estimated under oblivious equilibrium and
MPE strategies are very close.
2. Performance of the approximation depends on the richness of the equilibrium investment process.
When the bound is between 1-20% and there is a rich investment process, the long-run quantities
estimated under oblivious equilibrium and MPE strategies are still quite close. When the bound is
above 1% and there is little investment, the long-run quantities can be quite different on a percentage
basis (5% to 20%), but still remain fairly close in absolute terms (see Table 2).
3. The performance bound is not tight. For a wide range of parameters the performance bound is as
much as 10 to 20 times larger than the actual beneﬁt from deviating.
The previous results suggest that MPE dynamics are well-approximated by oblivious equilibrium strate-
gies when the approximation error bound is small (less than 1-2% and in some cases even up to 20 %). These
results, together with those from Subsection 6.2, demonstrate that the oblivious equilibrium approximation
signiﬁcantly expands the range of applied problems that can be analyzed computationally.
6.4 Example: The Evolution of Industry Structure as Market Size Increases
An important question in industrial organization is to understand what features of an industry are most
critical to determining the industry’s structure. Of particular interest (Sutton 1991) is whether a market
becomes fragmented, or remains concentrated, as the market grows in size. Sutton (1991) and Shaked and
Sutton (1987) suggest that the presence of “endogenous” sunk costs imposes a lower bound to concentration.
Our model is a dynamic model of endogenous sunk costs because, while entrants pay the same cost of
entry regardless of market size (an “exogenous” sunk cost), in larger markets they may need to invest large
amounts to become as large as the incumbent ﬁrms (an “endogenous” sunk cost). In what follows we show
30that under slightly different parameterizations of our model we get two extremely different outcomes: a
fragmented and a very concentrated industry.
We use the same parameter speciﬁcations as in Subsection 6.2 with the only difference that now we
consider ψ = 7 in the utility of the consumers. This speciﬁcation makes it easier to obtain the two different
situations. We ﬁx d = 0.5 and we compute the oblivious equilibrium for θ1 = 0.9 and θ1 = 1.2. In Figures
6 and 7 (see also Table 3) we present the average industry states obtained for different market sizes in the
two cases. For θ1 = 0.9, as the market size grows the industry becomes fragmented. The number of ﬁrms
grows but ﬁrms do not grow in size, so the market share for every ﬁrm converges to zero. When θ1 = 1.2
the entry rate decreases and ﬁrms grow larger as market size grows. In this second case, the industry state is
heavy-tailed.18
These results have a clear intuition: when θ1 > 1 consumers care more about quality and this increases
the returns to investment. What results is a quality race between ﬁrms, so there are a small number of
ﬁrms in the industry that become ever larger with the market size. When θ1 < 1 returns to investment are
lower and investment is not worthwhile above a certain point regardless of the market size. (Our simulations
suggest that for all θ1 < 1 the industry fragments, whereas for θ1 > 1 the industry remains concentrated as
market size increases.)
These results contradict Sutton (1991) in one sense because Sutton (1991) sought predictions about
market structure that are robust across a wide class of models. Here, different market structures result from
the same model through an arbitrarily small change in a single parameter. An implication of this result is that
the same industry might be observed with very different market structures across markets that are the same
size and that have indistinguishable characteristics. However, our results remain broadly consistent with
Sutton’s predictions because the parameter that determines market structure in our model pertains directly
to the returns to investment. Consistent with the predictions of Sutton (1991), industries with higher returns
to investment tend to be concentrated. Our results show, however, that this relationship can be very fragile.
7 Conclusions and Future Research
The goal of this paper has been to increase the set of applied economic problems that can be addressed using
Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. Due to the curse of dimension-
18To show the results more clearly, we forced the highest quality level to be 80. This leads the industry state to have a mass of
ﬁrms near 80 for the larger market sizes. Without this arbitrary cutoff ﬁrms would grow even larger and it becomes difﬁcult to solve
for the oblivious equilibrium (because the expected lifespan of a ﬁrm tends to inﬁnity and the industry state is heavy-tailed) as well
as to show the results graphically.
31ality, existing dynamic programming methods have limited application of these models to industries with
a small number of ﬁrms and a small number of states per ﬁrm. Even with accelerated methods (e.g., Judd
(1998), Pakes and McGuire (2001) and Doraszelski and Judd (2003)), it seems likely that it will never be
possible to solve for an MPE exactly in many problems of interest. As an alternative, we proposed a method
for approximating MPE behavior using an oblivious equilibrium, where ﬁrms make decisions only based on
their own state and the long run average industry state.
We began by showing that the approximation works well asymptotically, where asymptotics were taken
in the market size. A sufﬁcient condition for an oblivious equilibrium to well approximate a MPE asymp-
totically is that the sequence of industry states generated by the oblivious equilibria is “light-tailed” (as
described by Assumption 4.2). This condition is also sufﬁcient to establish that a model of the type intro-
duced in Hopenhayn (1992) yields a good approximation of a ﬁnite industry. We also introduced a simple
algorithm to compute an oblivious equilibrium. A nice feature of the algorithm is that there is no need to
place a’ priori restrictions on the number of ﬁrms in the industry or the set of states that a ﬁrm can reach. As
a result, computational considerations place very few constraints on model details.
To facilitate using oblivious equilibrium in practice, we derived approximation error bounds that indicate
how good the approximation is in any particular problem under study. These approximation error bounds
are quite general and thus can be used in a wide class of models. We believe them to be the ﬁrst bounds of
this type in this literature. Through computational experiments, we showed that oblivious equilibrium often
yields a good approximation of MPE behavior for industries with a couple hundred ﬁrms, and sometimes
even with just tens of ﬁrms.
We have considered very simple strategies that are functions only of a ﬁrm’s own state and the long run
average industry state. While our results show that these simple strategies work well in many cases, there
remains a set of problems where exact computation is not possible and yet our approximation will not work
well either. Such cases would likely involve industries with moderate to large numbers of ﬁrms that still
remain highly concentrated. For such cases, we hope is that our methods will serve as a basis for developing
better approximations that use additional information, such as the total number of ﬁrms in the industry, or
the states of the largest ﬁrm (or ﬁrms). Solving for equilibria of this type would be more difﬁcult than
solving for oblivious equilibria, but is still likely to be computationally feasible. Since showing that such an
approach would provide a good approximation is not a simple extension of our results, this will be a subject
of future research.
32A Proofs and Mathematical Arguments
A.1 Proofs and Mathematical Arguments for Section 2
A.1.1 The Poisson Entry Model
Suppose there are N potential entrants. Each potential entrant enters if the setup cost κ is less than the
expected present value of future cash ﬂows upon entry. Let vN(i) be the expected present value of future
cash ﬂows for each entering ﬁrm if i ﬁrms enter simultaneously. vN(i) is non-increasing in i. One can then
pose the problem faced by potential entrants as a game in which each entrant employs a mixed strategy and
enters with some probability pN. If we assume that every potential entrant employs the same strategy, the









N(1 − pN)N−1−ivN(i + 1) − κ = 0,
which is solved by a unique pN ∈ [0,1]. If κ < vN(N), the equilibrium is a pure strategy with pN = 1,
whereas if κ > vN(1), the equilibrium is given by pN = 0. The following result, which we state without
proof, establishes that our Poisson entry model can be viewed as a limiting case as the number of potential
entrants N grows large.
Lemma A.1. Let the following conditions hold:
1. vN(i) is non-increasing in i, ∀N, and non-increasing in N, ∀i;
2. there exists a positive number M such that |vN(i)| < M, ∀N, ∀i;
3. there exists N, such that ∀N > N, vN(i) − κ changes sign in {1,N − 1};
4. there exists a function v(i) such that limN→∞ supi∈N |vN(i) − v(i)| = 0.
Then,
1. for each N > N, Equation (A.1) has a unique solution p∗
N ∈ (0,1);
2. the limit λ = limN→∞ Np∗
N exists, and if YN is a binomial random variable with parameters (N,p∗
N)
and Z is a Poisson random variable with mean λ, then YN ⇒ Z.
The result states that if the numberof potential entrants growsto inﬁnity then theentry process converges
to a Poisson random variable. Hence, Poisson entry can be understood as the result of a large population of
potential entrants, each one playing a mixed strategy and entering the industry with a very small probability.
33A.1.2 Bellman’s Equation and Exit Cutoff Strategy
We deﬁne a dynamic programming operator:






(−dι + βEµ,λ [V (xi,t+1,s−i,t+1)|xit = x,s−i,t = s,ιit = ι])
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for all x ∈ N and s ∈ S.
To simplify the notation in this section we will let V
µ0
µ,λ ≡ V (·|µ0,µ,λ).













µ,λ is the unique ﬁxed point of Tµ,λ within the class of bounded functions.
Proof. Investment is bounded. Additionally, βφ ≤ ρ(x,s) ≤ π
1−β + φ, ∀x ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S. Therefore the
action space for each state is compact.
Foragivenstate(x,s), expectedoneperiodproﬁtsincludinginvestmentandsell-offvaluecanbewritten
as:
π(x,s) − dι(x,s)P[φ < ρ(x,s)] + E[φ | φ ≥ ρ(x,s)]P[φ ≥ ρ(x,s)] .
Note that π(x,s) < π, investment is bounded, and φ has ﬁnite expectation. Therefore, expected one period
proﬁts including investment and the sell-off value are uniformly bounded for all states (x,s). The result
follows by Propositions 1.2.2 and 3.1.7 in Bertsekas (2001).
By the lemma and the deﬁnition of the dynamic programming operator we observe that there exists an
optimal exit strategy that has the form of a cutoff value.
A.2 Proofs and Mathematical Arguments for Section 3
Lemma 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 hold. Assume that ﬁrms follow a common oblivious strategy
µ ∈ ˜ M, the expected entry rate is λ ∈ ˜ Λ, and the expected time that each ﬁrm spends in the industry is ﬁnite.
Let {Zx : x ∈ N} be a sequence of independent Poisson random variables with means {˜ sµ,λ(x) : x ∈ N},
and let Z be a Poisson random variable with mean
P
x∈N ˜ sµ,λ(x). Then,
(a) {st : t ≥ 0} is an irreducible, aperiodic and positive recurrent Markov chain;
(b) the invariant distribution of st is a product form of Poisson random variables;
34(c) for all x, st(x) ⇒ Zx;
(d) nt ⇒ Z.
Proof. If every ﬁrm uses a strategy µ ∈ ˜ M and entry is according to an entry rate function λ ∈ ˜ Λ, then
X ≡ {st : t ≥ 0} is clearly an irreducible Markov chain. All states reach the state ∅ = {0,0,...} with
positive probability and all states can be reached from ∅ as well. Now, take any state s ∈ S. There is a
positive probability that there is no entry, no exit and no ﬁrms’ state transitions. Therefore, for all s ∈ S,
P[st+1 = s

 st = s] > 0, so X is aperiodic. Moreover X is positive recurrent because the expected time to
come back from state ∅ to itself is ﬁnite (see Kleinrock (1975)).







where Wτ are i.i.d. Poisson random variables with mean λ, the ﬁrst sum is taken over all periods previous
to (and including) t, the second sum is taken over the ﬁrms that entered the industry in each period, and
for each τ, Xi,t−τ are random variables that represent the state of ﬁrm i after t − τ periods inside the
industry when using strategy µ. Since ﬁrms use oblivious strategy µ ∈ ˜ M and shocks are idiosyncratic
their state evolutions are independent, so 1{Xi,t−τ=x} are i.i.d. across i. It follows that
PWτ
i=1 1{Xi,t−τ=x} is
a ﬁltered Poisson random variable, so it is a Poisson random variable. Thus st(x), as a sum of independent
Poisson random variables, is also Poisson. Given that the expected time a ﬁrm spends inside the industry is
ﬁnite, using characteristic functions it is straightforward to show that st(x) ⇒ Zx, ∀x ∈ N. To show that
{Zx : x ∈ N} is a sequence of independent random variables note that by the ﬁltering property of Poisson
random variables (Durrett (1996)), for all t, {st(x) : x ∈ N} is a sequence of independent random variables.
By summing over x ∈ N, we can show that nt ⇒ Z.
Lemma 3.3. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 hold. Assume that ﬁrms follow a common oblivious strategy
µ ∈ ˜ M, the expected entry rate is λ ∈ ˜ Λ, and the expected time that each ﬁrm spends in the industry is
ﬁnite. Let {Yn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of integer-valued i.i.d. random variables, each distributed according
to ˜ sµ,λ(·)/
P







Proof. The proof is rather involved, but relies on a simple idea. For a Poisson process, conditional on
n arrivals on an interval [0,T], the unordered arrival times have the same distribution as n i.i.d. uniform
35random variables in [0,T].
Let us condition on nt = n. {x(j)t : j = 1,...,n} are the random variables that represent the
state of each of the n ﬁrms in the industry when they are sampled randomly. The expected time a ﬁrm
spends inside the industry is ﬁnite, so the time a ﬁrm spends inside the industry is ﬁnite with proba-
bility one. Recall that a ﬁrm can increase its quality level by at most w states each period. There-
fore, ∀ > 0, there exists a state z, such that for all j ∈ 1,...,n, ∀t, P[x(j)t > z] < 
n. That
is, the probability of observing a ﬁrm in a very large state is negligible, because ﬁrms “do not have
time” to get that far. Hence, P
hSn
j=1{x(j)t > z} | nt = n
i
<  ,∀t, so the sequence of random vec-
tors {(x(1)t,...,x(nt)t | nt = n) : t ≥ 0} is tight. By Theorem 9.1 in Durrett (1996) and the tightness





x(j)t = zj, j = 1,...,n







where p(·) is the PMF ˜ sµ,λ(·)/
P
x∈N ˜ sµ,λ(x). Let ˜ Tj be the entry date of ﬁrm (j) and Tj = t − ˜ Tj be its
age. Then we can write:
P
h
x(j)t = zj, j = 1,...,n







P[x(j)t = zj, j = 1,...,n | T1 = t1,...,Tn = tn,nt = n] ·









x(j)t = zj | Tj = tj

·
P [T1 = t1,...,Tn = tn | nt = n] , (A.4)
The last equation follows because the evolution of ﬁrms is independent across ﬁrms. Note that if any tj has
a value greater than t, then P
h














x(j)t = zj, Tj = tj





Tj = tj, Xj,tj = zj

P [Tj = tj]
=
P[Tj = tj]P[Xj,tj = zj]
P [Tj = tj]
= P[Xj,tj = zj] , (A.5)
where, similarly to above, Xj,tj is a random variable that represents a ﬁrm’s state after tj periods conditional
36on having stayed in the industry. Note that for all k, {Xj,k : j ≥ 1} are i.i.d. The second to last equation
follows because the evolution of a ﬁrm is independent of its entry time.
Now we show that
lim
t→∞




for some probability mass function u. This equation can be derived directly. However, it is easier to invoke
the relationship between nt and a Poisson process and show that the equation holds using known results for
Poisson processes.







where, for each τ, Ai,t−τ are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables that equal one if the ﬁrm is still in the
industry after t − τ periods when using strategy µ. Since Ai,t−τ are i.i.d., nt,τ ≡
PWτ
i=1 1{Ai,t−τ=1} is a
ﬁltered Poisson random variable, and is therefore Poisson. Call its mean αt,τ. It follows that nt is a sum of
independent Poisson random variables, so it is Poisson with mean
Pt
τ=0 αt,τ.
Consider {N(t) : t ≥ 0}, a homogeneous Poisson process on the real line with rate 1. Note that N(t)
and nt are equivalent in the sense that we can construct nt using the process





in the following way: for each 0 ≤ τ ≤ t, consider the events in the interval [αt,τ−1, αt,τ−1 + αt,τ], where
αt,−1 = 0. Assign those events to ﬁrms that are still in the industry at time t and entered at period τ,
nt,τ. Note that: i) N(αt,τ) and nt,τ are both Poisson with mean αt,τ; ii) N(t) has independent increments
and nt,τ are independent, for all τ; iii) N(
Pt






τ=0 αt,τ) = n. Conditional on that event, the unordered arrival times of N(t) have the
same distribution asn i.i.d. uniform random variables in [0,
Pt
τ=0 αt,τ] (Durrett (1996)). By the equivalence
argument described above, conditional on nt = n, the unordered arrival times of the n ﬁrms are i.i.d. discrete




,0 ≤ τ ≤ t .
Recall that αt,τ is the expected number of ﬁrms that entered at time τ and are still inside the industry at time
t. Since the entry rate is the same every period, every ﬁrm uses the same strategy which is independent of
every other ﬁrm, and shocks are idiosyncratic, αt,τ = ˜ αt−τ, where ˜ αt−τ is the expected number of ﬁrms
37that entered the industry at time s, for any s, and are still inside the industry at time s+t−τ. This suggests




,0 ≤ k ≤ t .
ut(k) is the probability a random sampled ﬁrm from the industry at time t entered k periods ago, conditional
on nt = n. Taking the limit as t tends to inﬁnity, we get that:
lim
t→∞
ut(k) ≡ u(k) =
˜ αk P∞
j=0 ˜ αj
, 0 ≤ k < ∞ ,
provided that limt→∞ E[nt] =
P∞
j=0 ˜ αj < ∞, which is true by assumption. u(k) is the probability a ran-
dom sampled ﬁrm from the industry at time t  0 entered k periods before the sampling period. Therefore
lim
t→∞

















where the interchange between the inﬁnite sum and the limit follows by dominated convergence. The sum
yields the PMF p(·). The previous equation proves that Y1,...,Yn are i.i.d. with PMF p(·) which does not
depend on n.
To ﬁnish, consider t  0. More formally, suppose that s0 is sampled from the invariant distribution,
which is well deﬁned by Lemma 3.2. In this case, st is a stationary process; st is distributed according to
the invariant distribution for all t ≥ 0.








Conditioning on nt, and considering that we already proved that {x(j)t : j = 1,...,n} are i.i.d. with PMF
p(·), we get that p(·) = ˜ sµ,λ(·)/
P
x∈N ˜ sµ,λ(x).
38A.3 Proofs and Mathematical Arguments for Section 4
A.3.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma A.3. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, for all x,
sup
m
˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) < ∞.
Proof. We will assume that x ≥ xe; the case of x < xe is trivial. Assume for contradiction that
supm ˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) = ∞. We will argue that this contradicts the zero proﬁt condition for entering
ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm invests ι > 0, there is a probability p(ι) > 0 that the ﬁrm will increase its quality level by at
least one unit. Let τ be the time a ﬁrm takes to transition from state xe to state x. If a ﬁrm invests ι > 0 in
each period, by a geometric trials argument, E[τ] < ∞. Therefore, there exists an investment strategy for
which the expected time and cost to transition from xe to x are uniformly bounded above over m. It follows
that supm ˜ V (m)(xe|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) = ∞. This contradicts the zero proﬁt condition.
Let `1,g = {f ∈ <∞
+ | kfk1,g < ∞}. With some abuse of notation, let S1,g = S1 ∩ `1,g.













  xit = x
#
< ∞.












If not, supm ˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) = ∞, because total investment cost is bounded by ι
1−β, violating Lemma
A.3.
































= kf − f0k1,g
< ∞.
39Lettingf = (1,0,0,...), usingAssumption4.2, itfollowsthatsupx∈N,m∈N |πm(x,f, ˜ n(m))−πm(x, ˜ s(m))| ≡
C < ∞. By Assumption 2.1.2, for all m ∈ <+, x ∈ N, and f ∈ S1, πm(x,f, ˜ n(m)) ≤ πm(x,f, ˜ n(m)) ≤
πm(x, ˜ s(m)) + C. The result then follows from (A.6).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1.2, and 4.2, ˜ n(m) = Ω(m).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that liminfm
˜ n(m)
m = 0. Then there exists an increasing sequence mk
such that limk
˜ n(mk)
mk = 0, and by Assumption 4.1.2, for all x,z ∈ N with x > z, and f ∈ S1,z,
limk→∞ πmk(x,f, ˜ n(mk)) = ∞.



































πm(x, ˜ f(m), ˜ n(m))







πm(x, ˜ f(m), ˜ n(m)) ≥ (1 − )πm(x, ˆ f(m), ˜ n(m)),
for a sequence ˆ f(m) ∈ S1,z with sufﬁciently large z, and for all x and m. This implies that for all x > z,
limk→∞ πmk(x, ˜ f(mk), ˜ n(mk)) = ∞, which contradicts Lemma A.3. It follows that ˜ n(m) = Ω(m).
A.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3















Proof. By a simple analysis of the Poisson distribution, it is easy to show that if n is a Poisson random








  ≥ δ
i
≤ e−Θ(˜ n).
By Lemma 3.2, n
(m)
t is a Poisson random variable with mean ˜ n(m). By Theorem 4.2, ˜ n(m) = Ω(m). The
result follows.
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1.2, and 4.2, hold. Then, as m grows, n
(m)
t /˜ n(m) →p 1 and
kf
(m)
t − ˜ f(m)k1,g →p 0.
Proof. Convergence of n
(m)
t /˜ n(m) follows from Lemma A.5. To complete the proof, we will establish
convergence of kf
(m)
t − ˜ f(m)k1,g. Note that for any z ∈ N,
kf
(m)

















We will show that for any z, A
(m)
z converges in probability to zero, that for any δ > 0, for sufﬁciently large z,
limm→∞ P[C
(m)
z ≥ δ] = 0, andthatforanyδ > 0and > 0, forsufﬁcientlylargez, limsupm→∞ P[B
(m)
z ≥
δ] ≤ /δ. The assertion that kf
(m)
t − ˜ f(m)k1,g →p 0 follows from these facts.
By Lemma 3.3, for any x, (f
(m)
t (x) | n
(m)
t = n) is distributed as the empirical mean of n i.i.d. Bernoulli
random variables with expectation ˜ f(m)(x). It follows that for any x, (|f
(m)
t (x) − ˜ f(m)(x)| | nt = n)
converges in probability to zero uniformly over m as n grows. By Theorem 4.2 and the fact that n
(m)
t /˜ n(m)
converges in probability to 1, for any n, limm→∞ P[n
(m)
t ≤ n] = 0. It follows that for any z, A
(m)
z
converges in probability to zero.
By Assumption 4.2, for any δ > 0, for sufﬁciently large z, limsupm→∞ C
(m)
z < δ, and therefore,
limm→∞ P[C
(m)
z ≥ δ] = 0. By Tonelli’s Theorem, E[B
(m)
z ] = C
(m)
z . Invoking Markov’s inequality, for
any δ > 0 and  > 0, for sufﬁciently large z, limsupm→∞ P[B
(m)
z ≥ δ] ≤ /δ. The result follows.
A.4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4
The following technical lemma follows immediately from Assumption 4.1.3. We omit the proof.
Lemma A.6. Let Assumptions 2.1.3 and 4.1.3 hold. Then, for all  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all





πm(x,f,n) − πm(x,f, ˆ n)
πm(x,f, ˆ n)
 
  < .
















Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we will assume that all expectations are conditioned on xit = x and
s
(m)
−i,t ∼ q(m). Note that if s
(m)
−i,t is distributed according to q(m), then the marginal distribution of s
(m)
−i,k is






−i,t, ˜ n(m))|. Fix  > 0 and let δ > 0 satisfy




t /˜ n(m) − 1





























































where the second to last inequality follows from Lemma A.6 and Assumption 4.1.1. Since  is arbitrary, the
expected sum is ﬁnite (by Lemma A.4), and P[Z(m)] ≤ e−Ω(m) (by Lemma A.5), the result follows.
The following technical lemma follows immediately from assumptions on the proﬁt function. We omit
the proof.
Lemma A.8. Let Assumptions 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 hold. Then, for all  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for




















−i,k, ˜ n(m)) − πm(xik, ˜ s(m))|
 





Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we will assume that all expectations are conditioned on xit = x and
42s
(m)




−i,t, ˜ n(m)) − πm(xit, ˜ s(m))|. Fix  > 0 and let δ satisfy the assertion
of Lemma A.8. Let Z(m) denote the event kf
(m)













































for some constant C > 0. The inequality follows from Lemmas A.4 and A.8.
Note that ∆
(m)








































because supµ∈M is attained by an oblivious strategy, so f
(m)
−i,k evolves independently from x
(m)
ik . Since 
is arbitrary, P[Z(m)] → 0 (by Theorem 4.3), and the expected sum is uniformly bounded over all m (by
Lemma A.4), the result follows.
Theorem 4.4. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1, and 4.2, the sequence {˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)} of oblivious equi-
libria possesses the AME property.
Proof. Let µ∗(m) be an optimal (non-oblivious) best response to (˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)); in particular,
V (m)(x,s|µ∗(m), ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) = sup
µ∈M
V (m)(x,s|µ, ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)).
Let
ˆ V (m)(x,s) = V (m)(x,s|µ∗(m), ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) − V (m)(x,s|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) ≥ 0.




43For any m, because ˜ µ(m) and ˜ λ(m) attain an oblivious equilibrium, for all x,
˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) = sup
˜ µ∈ ˜ M
˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ, ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) = sup
˜ µ∈M
˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ, ˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)),
where the last equation follows because there will always be an optimal oblivious strategy when optimizing
an oblivious value function even if we consider more general strategies. It follows that
ˆ V (m)(x,s) =













˜ V (m)(x|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m)) − V (m)(x,s|˜ µ(m), ˜ λ(m))

≡ A(m)(x,s) + B(m)(x,s).
To complete the proof, we will establish that E˜ µ(m),˜ λ(m)[A(m)(x,s
(m)








−i,t)−πm(xit, ˜ s(m))|. It is easy to see
that























and letting q(m) be the invariant distribution of s
(m)












































−i,k, ˜ n(m))| + |πm(xik,f
(m)
−i,k, ˜ n(m)) − πm(xik, ˜ s(m))|.
44The result therefore follows from Lemmas A.7 and A.9.
A.4.3 Derivations for the Logit Demand Model Outlined in Subsection 6.1
It is direct to check that Assumptions 2.1, 4.1.1, and 4.1.2 are satisﬁed. Now, we show that Assumption



















where S is the set of ﬁrms in state s = fn, and px is the price charged by the ﬁrm in state x. The ﬁrst term
takes into account the direct change in proﬁts due to the change on the number of ﬁrms keeping prices ﬁxed.






z∈N f(z)(1 + z)θ1(Y − pz)θ2
1 + n
P























 < ∞. The complete derivation is
long and algebraically cumbersome so it is omitted. However, we note a couple of important points. To
compute
∂pi





, hence the sum, even if it includes an inﬁnite number of terms, remains bounded.























n(1 + x)θ1(Y − px)θ2
1 + n
P














The second and third terms in equation (A.8) can be bound in a similar way to (A.7). The result follows.
45A.5 Proofs and Mathematical Arguments for Section 5
A.5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 5.1. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any oblivious equilibrium (˜ µ, ˜ λ) and ﬁrm

























ax(y)(π(y, ˜ s) − E [π(y,s)]),
where ∆π(s) = maxy∈N (π(y,s) − π(y, ˜ s)).
Proof. We derive the second bound, beginning with the following proposition. Let µ∗ be an optimal (non-
oblivious) best response to an oblivious equilibrium (˜ µ, ˜ λ) for a ﬁrm that is keeping track of the industry
state.
Proposition A.1.
E[V (x,s|µ∗, ˜ µ, ˜ λ) − ˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ)] ≤
1
1 − β
E[∆π(s)] , ∀x ∈ N .
Proof. By a similar argument to the one at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 4.4, we have that
(A.12)
V (x,s|µ∗, ˜ µ, ˜ λ) − ˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ) ≤ Eµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ
" τi X
k=t
βk−t (π(xik,s−i,k) − π(xik, ˜ s))
 
xit = x,s−i,t = s
#
.
The equation can be rewritten as:






Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[xik = y,s−i,k = s0 | xit = x,s−i,t = s] ·
 
π(y,s0) − π(y, ˜ s)

, (A.13)
where Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[xik = y,s−i,k = s0 | xit = x,s−i,t = s] is the probability ﬁrm i, currently in state x with
competitors in state s, will be in state y and s0, respectively, k − t periods from now.
46We can write:
Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[xik = y,s−i,k = s0 | xit = x,s−i,t = s] = Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[xik = y | s−i,k = s0,xit = x,s−i,t = s] ·
Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[s−i,k = s0 | xit = x,s−i,t = s]
= Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[xik = y | s−i,k = s0,xit = x,s−i,t = s] ·
P˜ µ,˜ λ[s−i,k = s0 | s−i,t = s].
The last equation follows because rival ﬁrms use strategy ˜ µ, which only depends on their own state, and the
entry rate is ˜ λ independent of the industry state. Substituting into equation (A.13) gives:





P˜ µ,˜ λ[s−i,k = s0 | s−i,t = s]
X
y∈N
Pµ∗,˜ µ,˜ λ[xik = y | s−i,k = s0,xit = x,s−i,t = s]
 







P˜ µ,˜ λ[s−i,k = s0 | s−i,t = s]max
y∈N
 
π(y,s0) − π(y, ˜ s)

, (A.14)
Recall that q(s) is the invariant distribution of {st : t ≥ 0}, where st is the industry state at time t when




q(s)P˜ µ,˜ λ[s−i,k = s0 | s−i,t = s]










































π(y,s0) − π(y, ˜ s)

(A.16)
The ﬁrst equation follows by Fubini and the second one by equation (A.15). The previous argument is valid
47for any x ∈ N, therefore:
E[V (x,st|µ∗, ˜ µ, ˜ λ) − ˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ)] ≤
1
1 − β
E[∆π(st)] , ∀x ∈ N ,
where st is a random vector distributed according to q.
Returning to the derivation of the bound, we have that:
(A.17)
E[V (x,s|µ∗, ˜ µ, ˜ λ) − V (x,s|˜ µ, ˜ λ)] = E[V (x,s|µ∗, ˜ µ, ˜ λ) − ˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ)] + E[˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ) − V (x,s|˜ µ, ˜ λ)]
The ﬁrst term is bounded by the previous proposition. Let us analyze the second term:
˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ) − V (x,s|˜ µ, ˜ λ) = E˜ µ,˜ λ
" τi X
k=t
βk−t (π(xik, ˜ s) − π(xik,s−i,k))








P˜ µ,˜ λ[s−i,k = s0 | s−i,t = s] ·
X
y∈N
P˜ µ[xik = y | xit = x]
 
π(y, ˜ s) − π(y,s0)

. (A.18)
The last equation follows because under oblivious strategies ﬁrms’ trajectories are independent. Multiplying
each term by q(s), summing over all s ∈ S and interchanging sums in the right hand side using Fubini we
obtain:





P˜ µ[xik = y | xit = x](π(y, ˜ s) − E [π(y,st)]) ,
Finally, interchanging the sums
(A.20) E[˜ V (x|˜ µ, ˜ λ) − V (x,st|˜ µ, ˜ λ)] =
X
y∈N
ax(y)(π(y, ˜ s) − E [π(y,st)]) .
The second bound follows by equations (A.17), (A.20), and the proposition. The ﬁrst one follows by a
similar argument, but with the difference that we take maxy∈N in equation (A.18) and we take absolute
value of the difference of one period proﬁts in equations (A.14) and (A.18).
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51B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Comparison of MPE and OE strategies (4 ﬁrms, no entry and exit)
Parameters Long Run Statistics (% Diff) Perf Bound (% Diff) Actual (% Diff)
Prod Cons Max Weighted Max Weighted
θ1 d Inv. Surp Surp C1 C2 Diff Avg Diff Avg
0.10 0.10 −0.26 −0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07
0.30 0.30 −0.13 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.16 1.67 1.22 0.04 0.01
0.50 0.50 −0.11 0.20 0.28 0.18 0.50 6.64 3.61 0.21 0.06
0.70 0.70 −2.21 0.40 0.15 1.08 2.09 18.85 8.35 1.60 0.67
0.85 0.70 −2.19 0.23 −0.28 1.37 2.10 30.80 9.64 1.80 0.20
0.15 0.27 3.54 0.14 0.2 1.22 0.46 0.36 0.35 0.1 0.1
0.20 0.35 4.18 0.29 0.42 1.93 1.03 0.81 0.77 −0.09 −0.05
0.30 0.55 9.28 0.93 1.31 5.10 2.45 1.96 1.85 0.26 0.25
0.40 0.80 21.02 2.10 2.93 11.58 4.12 3.01 2.92 0.30 0.29
0.50 1.00 18.62 3.30 4.33 15.69 5.94 6.29 5.86 0.32 0.30
Long run statistics and value functions simulated with a relative precision of 1.0% and a conﬁdence level of
99%. Error bound simulated with a relative precision of at most 10% and a conﬁdence level of 99%.
52Table 2: Comparison of MPE and OE Investment (4 ﬁrms, no entry and exit)
Parameters Investment
θ1 d MPE OE % Diff
0.10 0.10 0.752 0.754 −0.26
0.30 0.30 0.754 0.755 −0.13
0.50 0.50 0.741 0.742 −0.11
0.70 0.70 0.694 0.709 −2.21
0.85 0.70 0.748 0.765 −2.19
0.15 0.27 0.192 0.185 3.54
0.20 0.35 0.261 0.250 4.18
0.30 0.55 0.238 0.216 9.28
0.40 0.80 0.168 0.133 21.02
0.50 1.00 0.195 0.158 18.62
Investment simulated with a relative precision of
1.0% and a conﬁdence level of 99%.
Table 3: Percentage approximation error bounds evaluated at the entry state for industries in Fig-









Error bound and value functions simulated with
a relative precision of at most 10% and 1.0%, re-
spectively, and a conﬁdence level of 99%.
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